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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
HEATHER RICHARDS,

Appellate Court No. 20080855

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the denial of a Motion to Suppress filed in accordance with
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12. The Defendant entered a Sery plea, (State v.
Sery, 758 P.2d 935), in which her right to appeal the trial court's denial of her Motion to
Suppress was reserved. The Defendant plead guilty to Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of UCA § 58-378. The trial court accepted the Defendant's guilty plea and sentenced the Defendant to a
stayed indeterminate term of imprisonment of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison
and imposed one hundred twenty days in the Summit County Jail, stayed pending
resolution of this action. The Defendant is not incarcerated and imposition of the jail
sentence was stayed pending the outcome of this appeal. This Court has jurisdiction
4

pursuant to UCA § 78A-4-103(2)(e).
ISSUE OF APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DETERMINING
THERE TO BE SUFFICIENT REASONABLE SUSPICION
TO EXTEND THE DETENTION IN THIS MATTER
BEYOND THE PURPOSE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP?
Standard of Review: Challenges to suppression rulings present questions of law that this
Court reviews for correctness. State v. Wilkinson, 197 P.3d 96, 616 citing Lavton Citv v.
Oliver, 139 P.3d 281 ("We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for
correctness, without deference to the trial court's application of the law to the facts.").
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
58-37-8. Prohibited acts -- Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A -- Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly
and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce,
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;...
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:...
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third
degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree
felony;
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
5

(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:...
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 12. Motions.
(a) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion, which, unless
made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in accordance with this rule. A
motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and
the relief sought. A motion need not be accompanied by a memorandum unless required
by the court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Heather Richards was charged in the Third District Court of Summit County with
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony,
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Improper Usage of Lanes, and Following Another
Vehicle Too Closely. The Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress based on claim of an
unjustified extension of the traffic stop. The Motion to Suppress was denied. The
Defendant entered a Sery plea to the possession charge. The remaining charges were
dismissed. Heather Richards is not currently incarcerated and timely filed a Notice of
Appeal on October 14, 2008.
6

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 8, 2007, The Defendant was operating a vehicle on 1-80 eastbound
in Summit County, State of Utah. (R 54/6) Trooper Jason Jensen of the Utah Highway
Patrol was on duty and observed the Defendant's vehicle drift over the fogline. (R 54/6)
Trooper Jensen also observed the Defendant following another car too closely. (R 54/6)
Trooper Jensen initiated a traffic stop. Upon contact, Trooper Jensen asked the
Defendant to produce her driver's license and supporting documents. The Defendant did
so. Trooper Jensen observed a spray bottle of Armor All, a can of Lysol, and a fast food
sack on the passenger floor. (R 54/9) Trooper Jensen also observed two cellular phones
on the passenger seat, a pocket atlas, and orange rinds. (R 54/9) Trooper Jensen also
detected an odor of air fresheners. (R 54/9) Trooper Jensen ran the Defendant's license
and registration for insurance and outstanding warrants. The car was properly registered,
insured and there were no outstanding warrants. (R 55/8) Trooper Jensen returned to the
Defendant's vehicle and gave her a warning for following too closely. (R 55/16) Trooper
Jensen then questioned the Defendant as to whether she had any drugs in the vehicle or
consumed any drugs and/or alcohol. (R 54/11) The Defendant responded "no" to all
questions. (R 54/11) Trooper Jensen did not note any nervous or furtive behavior during
the stop. (R 54/24,25) Trooper Jensen requested to search the vehicle; the Defendant
refused. (R 54/11) Trooper Jensen stated that he was looking for a reason to search the
vehicle. (R 55/9, R25 (video)). Trooper Jensen then indicated that he was going to run a
drug dog around the car. (R 55/23) Trooper Jensen had his own drug dog in his vehicle,
7

but his dog was ineffective that evening. (R 55/30) The dog that was used for the drug
sniff belonged to another police officer who arrived on the scene as back up. The dog
indiciated on the trunk, and the trunk was searched. (R 55/12,13) Approximately 60 lbs
of marijuana were located in the trunk. (R 55/15) Subsequent to the vehicle search, a
pipe used to smoke marijuana was found on the Defendant's person. (R 55/16) Trooper
Jensen charged the Defendant with Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to
Distribute, UCA § 58-37-8, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, UCA § 58-37A-5,
Improper Usage of Lanes UCA § 41-6A-710, and Following Another Vehicle Too
Closely, UCA 41-6A-711. (R 001-003)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The purpose of the stop in this matter was for a traffic violation. (R 54/6,7)
Trooper Jensen checked the registration, insurance and license and returned them to the
Defendant and gave her a warning. (R 55/16,17) Trooper Jensen then extended the stop
by asking a series of questions, as well as running a drug dog around the vehicle. (R 55/911) Trooper Jensen lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the detention beyond that of a
routine traffic stop. Because Trooper Jensen lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the
stop beyond that of the traffic stop, when the traffic stop was concluded, any evidence
gathered after the moment the traffic stop concluded should have been suppressed by the
trial court. The trial court denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; the Defendant believes
the trial court erred in its ruling.
ARGUMENT
8

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DETERMINING
THERE TO BE SUFFICIENT REASONABLE SUSPICION
TO EXTEND THE DETENTION IN THIS MATTER
BEYOND THE PURPOSE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP?

In its Memorandum Decision dated May 21, 2008, the Court found that the traffic
stop reached its conclusion when Trooper Jensen returned the Defendant's documents
and issued a warning. (R 55/16,17) This Court is not required to make a determination
when the traffic stop had ended; the trial court already made that determination. The
Court also made a determination that the extension of the stop was not consensual and
constituted a continued detention. (R 72,73). The sole issue squarely before this Court is
whether the trial court erred in its determination that sufficient reasonable suspicion
existed to extend the detention beyond the purpose of the original traffic stop.
Trooper Jensen relied on the following facts in extending the detention: (1) he did
not believe the Defendant's travel story; (2) a can of Armor All on the floor; (3) orange
peels; (4) a can of Lysol on the floor; (5) fast food container(s) on the floor; (6) two
cellular telephones; (7) a strong odor of air fresheners. (R 54/9)
The trial court addressed most of the foregoing clues in its March 21, 2008
Memorandum Decision. The Court dismissed Trooper Jensen's suspicion generated from
the Defendant's story that her son did not like to fly. The Court stated that the story "is
not a factor that adds anything, even in combination, with the other factors." (R 73) The
trial court did not address the issue of the fast food containers. The Court briefly
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addressed Trooper Jensen by noting that "some people, but probably few, have may have
two cell phones." (R 74).
The trial court focused most of its attention on the air fresheners. The trial court
believed that the strong and overwhelming odor, caused by multiple sources, formed
sufficient reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. (R 74) The trial court articulated its
position concisely when it stated, "In combination and totality, the 'odor' factors
amounted to reasonable suspicion to further detain defendant." (R 74). Yet, ironically,
when asked whether he discovered the source of the overwhelmingly strong odor as a
result of the search of the vehicle, Trooper Jensen responded, "I never reached that
conclusion." (R 54/27,28)
The Defendant believes that the statements of Trooper Jensen, both at the time of
the stop and on the stand, are important in determining whether he had reasonable
suspicion to extend the stop. The Trooper requested to search the Defendant's vehicle, to
which she replied, "no." (R 54/11) In response to the refusal, Trooper Jensen stated that
he was looking for a reason to search the car, implying that he had no reason at that time.
(R 55/25 (video)) The Trooper's statement that he was looking for a reason is the best
indicator that he did not have any reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle and that he
was hoping that the Defendant would create it for him.
Trooper Jensen's testimony conflicts with itself between the preliminary hearing
in the case and the evidentiary hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. At the
preliminary hearing, Trooper Jensen testified that at the time he returned Defendant's
10

driver's license and other documents to her, she was free to leave. (R 54/28) Trooper
Jensen repeated the testimony at the suppression hearing stating, "Yes. Her stuff was
returned to her. She could have left." (R 55/17). The Defendant believes his testimony
establishes that at that moment, according to Trooper Jensen himself, he did not have any
reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. Trooper Jensen then modified his testimony at
the motion to suppress hearing by making the seemingly conflicting statement that, "she
was free to leave, but I would not have let her go." (R 55/19) The Defendant believes
this curious statement was to hedge against the trial court finding that continuation of the
stop was not consensual. In other words, if the trial court found continuation of the stop
to be non-consensual (which the trial court indeed found), then there was a fall back
position of reasonable suspicion to continue the stop. The trial court put little emphasis
on Trooper Jensen's testimony and statements, calling the inconsistent statements
"irrelevant" because the determination of reasonable suspicion, "is an objective one for
the court." (R 72)
The Defendant respectfully disagrees with the trial court. While no specific case
law on point exists, the Defendant believes Trooper Jensen's subjective belief and
impressions at the time of the extension of the stop help create an appropriate context in
which whether reasonable suspicion existed is determined. At the exact moment of the
extension of the stop, Trooper Jensen was searching for a reason to search the vehicle but
could find none and that the Defendant was free to go, according to his testimony given
on two separate occasions. (R 54/28, R 55/17) Trooper Jensen's mind-set at that moment
11

took into consideration all of the factors previously stated, i.e. the two cell phones, the
reason for travel, the fast food containers and the air fresheners. The Defendant submits
that the foregoing fails to form any level of suspicion, much less reasonable suspicion.
Nevertheless, the trial court based its finding of reasonable suspicion on a strong
and overwhelming odor of a combination four air fresheners and thus the Defendant
addresses those concerns. Air fresheners, coupled with other indicia of criminal activity,
support a reasonable brief inquiry for puiposes of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. U.S. v.
Alvarez, 68 F.3d 1242; U.S. v. Farias, 43 F.Supp 2d 1276; State v. Hechtle, 89 P.3d 185.
However, the other indicia must be clear. Farias, at 1283.
Case law exists that sheds light on what facts constitute indicia of criminal
activity. Traveling at what may seem a suspicious time in a suspicious location alone is
insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 (1991);
State v.Truullo, 739 P.2d 85, 89 (1987). Nervous behavior in the presence of police
officers, alone, is also not enough. State v. Lovegreen, 829 P.2d 155, 158 (1992). The
fact an individual previously has been involved in criminal activity is also not enough.
State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (1993). Most on point in the present case is U.S. v.
Farias, 43 F.Supp.2d 1276. In Farias, the question posed to the court was whether there
was sufficient indicia of criminal activity to extend a detention. The officer observed the
smell of several air fresheners, a road atlas, fast food wrappers, little luggage in the
vehicle and a suspicious travel story. Farias, at 1282, 1283. The Farias court determined
that insufficient indicia of criminal activity existed to warrant continuation of the
12

detention. Id at 1283.
The question posed to this Court is whether indicia of criminal activity existed in
this case to couple with the odor of air fresheners. In applying the above case law,
Trooper Jensen did not observe: (1) suspicious travel; (2) suspicious location; (3) nervous
behavior; (4) criminal history. Trooper Jensen did not observe any indications of drug or
alcohol use. Trooper Jensen did observe a road atlas, fast food containers and what he
believed was a suspicious travel story. However, the Farias court found that the
foregoing does not constitute indicia of evidence. Id.
Thus, the following question: what other observations did Trooper Jensen make
that could constitute indicia of criminal activity? The answer is none; each and every
observation made by Trooper Jensen was addressed in the cited cases. Trooper Jensen
smelled air fresheners but without indicia of criminal activity beyond the presence of air
fresheners, there is no reasonable suspicion upon which extension of the detention may
be based.
As such, once the purpose of the stop was completed, Trooper Jensen was required
to allow the Defendant to proceed on her way. State v. Lopez, 873, P.2d 1127. Instead,
he continued his questioning. In State v. Hansen, the officer questioned Hansen about
whether he had alcohol, drugs, or weapons in his vehicle and asked if he could search his
vehicle for these items. State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650. The Hansen officer conceded he
had no reasonable suspicion of a further illegality to justify the additional questioning.
Id at 653. The Hansen court held that since the scope of questioning exceeded, without
13

justification, the purpose of the initial traffic stop, the continued encounter was illegal
unless some other circumstance justified the additional questioning. Id.
CONCLUSION
Trooper Jensen had no reasonable suspicion justifying the extension of the
detention in this case beyond that of a traffic stop. Once the purpose of the traffic stop
was effectuated, which the trial court found it was when Trooper Jensen returned the
Defendant's documents to her with a warning, Trooper Jensen was required to allow the
Defendant to leave. Trooper Jensen extended the stop by asking additional questions and
running a drug dog. The extension of the stop was unjustified and the evidence gathered
from the moment the purpose of the traffic stop was effectuated should have been
suppressed by the trial court. The trial court erred in denying the Defendant's Motion to
Suppress seeking to suppress all evidence gathered after the moment the purpose of the
traffic stop was effectuated.
DATED this ^

day of March, 2009
THE STONE LAW FIRM

Stone
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this z 7 , ^ day of March, 2009, a copy of the
foregoing was hand delivered to: Mark Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General, Attorney for the
Plaintiff, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah.
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Exhibit A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
Case No. 071500331
vs.
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK
HEATHER M. RICHARDS,
Defendant.
DATE: May 21, 2008
The above matter came before the court for decision on
Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

BACKGROUND
An information was filed on November 15, 2007, charging
defendant with possession of a controlled substance, possession
of drug paraphernalia and two traffic offenses, improper lane
travel and following too close. After being bound over after a
preliminary hearing on March 3, 2008, defendant filed a motion to
suppress on March 26, 2008.

An evidentiary hearing was held

April 7, 2008, the court took the matter under advisement and
allowed the parties to file further memoranda. Defendant filed a
further memorandum May 2, 2008, the State filed its response May
13, 2008. Oral argument was held May 19, 2008.

The court took

the issues under advisement.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Jason Jensen (Jensen) was on
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duty on November 8, 2007, at about 9:45 p.m. when he observed a
vehicle on 1-80 traveling eastbound.

The vehicle drifted over

the "fog" line, or solid line marking the outside of the lane
separating the roadway from the dirt shoulder.

Then the vehicle

drifted into the fast, or left lane, and it was following another
vehicle at the distance of one car length in that fast lane.
Based on those observations Jensen stopped the vehicle at about
mile post 148 and approached the passenger side. The event was
captured and is on a DVD which was introduced into evidence and
which has been viewed by the court. Ex. 1.
2. Defendant was the driver and sole occupant.

Jensen asked

for license and registration and defendant produced a California
driver license and a registration in the name of another person.
3. Jensen asked where defendant was going and she said to
get her son in Minnesota as he did not like to fly after Jensen
asked why she was not flying. Jensen saw a photo of a four or
five year old child, in the console area of the vehicle, and
believed that explanation to be fanciful as it was his belief
that any young child would like to fly and he based that on his
experience that his own children like to fly.
4. During this interchange of documents and conversation
Jensen saw a can of Armor-All on the floor, several orange peels
lying about on the floor and partially in and out of containers,
a can of Lysol and fast food items on the floor.

He also saw two

-2-
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cell phones and the vehicle had a strong, overwhelming odor of
air fresheners.
5. Jensen ran a documents check and the license was valid
and there were no warrants for defendant.

He returned to

defendant and returned her documents to her. He gave her some
instructions on not following too closely.
6. Jensen then asked defendant if he could ask some
questions and she said yes.

Jensen did not tell defendant she

was free to leave nor did she ask if she could leave.

He was

parked behind her and his emergency lights were still engaged.
Another officer had arrived and could not be seen on the camera
but his voice could be heard and thus the court finds that the
second officer was thus out if his vehicle when Jensen returned
to defendant's vehicle.
Jensen.

That other trooper was parked behind

Jensen asked defendant if she had any prescription drugs

or weapons or illegal substances, then asked if she had
marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, or ecstacy and she
said no.

He asked if she used such substances and she said no.

He asked if he could search her vehicle and she said no. He asked
why not and she responded that he had no reason to search. Jensen
stated he was going to have a dog run around the vehicle and if
it indicated that would be probable cause to search the vehicle.
He asked her to roll up her window.
7. The other trooper, Cole Douglas (Douglas) who had arrived
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at the scene was asked to get his dog out as Jensen's dog was not
working well that night.

In fact Jensen had his own service

animal in his, Jensen's vehicle.

Douglas "ran" his drug

detection dog around the vehicle defendant was driving.

The dog

alerted on the trunk area and placed his nose on the rear license
plate and scratched at the area.
8. Jensen then went to defendant and defendant, who was on
the cell phone at the time telling someone she was being asked to
get out of her car, to get out and as she did so she dropped an
object onto the ground, and it was a smoking pipe.

Jensen asked

what that was and defendant said she was trying to hide it.
9. The troopers opened the trunk and found a large amount of
marijuana, about 60 pounds. They first searched the interior of
the vehicle.
10. The -entire event, from the stop to the point the dog
"hit" on the rear of the vehicle, took from 2143 hours to 2157
hours, or 14 minutes.

From the time Jensen returned the

documents to defendant it was 4 minutes until the dog hit on the
rear of defendant's vehicle according to the recording of the
event. Thus, the claimed illegal detention in this case was the
period of 4 minutes plus but under 5 minutes according to the
recording.

-4-

00

DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Here the stop is not challenged and it was justified
based on the driving pattern where defendant crossed over the fog
line then followed another vehicle too closely. The actual search
is not challenged and the only issue is whether there was
sufficient objective suspicion to justify a detention beyond the
traffic stop.
2. As is the clear Utah law, as recently reflected in
v.

Baker,

2008

UT App 115,

State

a seizure occurs if in view of all the

circumstances a reasonable person would have believed he was not
free to leave.

The State bears the burden of proving the

reasonableness of the officer's actions during an investigative
detention. The officer may detain the driver to conduct a limited
investigation of the circumstances that caused the detention.
The detention, if it exceeds the reason for the original traffic
stop, must be temporary and necessary and must be based on
reasonable suspicion the officer can articulate.

The court looks

to the totality of the circumstances to determine if there is an
objective basis for suspecting criminal activity and for a
continued detention.
3. Here, obviously, the officer stopped the vehicle for
traffic violations and in the legitimate course of that
investigation observed facts that, at least to the officer,
yielded suspicion sufficient to justify a further detention. Of

-5-
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course the legal question is not whether this officer believed
there was sufficient basis for the detention, but it is an
objective question. The traffic issues had been resolved by that
time after the officer legitimately obtained her documents, ran
checks, and engaged in brief contestation about defendant's
destination and travel.
already lawful stop.

That conversation did not delay the

The issue clearly then is whether those

observations objectively, as opposed to subjectively, amount to
reasonable suspicion to justify the continued detention.
4. Further, as to defendant's concerns about Jensen's
"contradictory" statements about whether defendant was or was not
free to leave, those feelings and testimony of Jensen,
respectfully to Jensen, irrelevant.
standard.

It is again an objective

A person is not detained because the officer believes

there is a detention or testifies there is a detention, nor is
the person free to leave because the officer believes or
testifies she is free to leave. That determination is an
objective one for the court.
5. Once Jensen returned the documents to defendant she was
either free to leave or detained. The State does not contend this
was a consensual encounter and it was not, despite Jensen's
possible belief and testimony she may have been free to leave. If
a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave
the person was seized.

Here, the court concludes there was a
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continued seizure.

The officer was talking to defendant, his

emergency lights were on in back of defendant's vehicle, there
was another officer present, the officer was asking about drugs
being in the vehicle, and the court concludes it is a rare
person, when an officer is talking through a window to a driver,
who would believe they are free to leave. It is true defendant
did not ask if she could leave, but all the factors indicate to
the court that defendant, as an objectively reasonable person,
would not feel free to leave.

Jensen did not tell defendant she

was free to leave. That is not, of course, required for this to
be a consensual encounter, but it remains a factor. In total here
there is no indication that a reasonable person would have felt
free to leave, and so the court concludes defendant was in fact
detained after Jensen returned the documents to her and continued
to speak with her.
6. Here, the factors observed by Jensen are frequent and
recurring and fairly "standard."

Jensen believed the travel

plans made little sense because defendant stated her son,
approximately age 5, did not like to fly.

While that may be

unusual, it is not of course by itself unreasonable. The court
concludes it is not a legitimate factor that the court considers
as it was and is based on Jensen's personal experiences.

While

it may have been suspicious to Jensen, it is not a factor that
adds anything, even in combination, with the other factors.

-7-
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7. Jensen observed many indications of odor masking agents.
Not only was there an overwhelming odor of air fresheners, but a
can of Lysol, a can of Armor All, orange peels, and other air
fresheners.

There were two cell phones.

Again, none of those by

themselves would amount to any level of reasonable suspicion
because many people have an air freshener, for example.
but probably few, may have two cell phones.

Some,

But, based on

training and experience, the strong and overwhelming odor, caused
by at least 4 different odor-producing agents that were present,
could reasonably and objectively be seen as masking agents for
the odor of drugs.

That, to this court, is an objective set of

circumstances that justified the officer in asking questions,
that is, further detaining defendant.

Given those objective

indications of possible criminal activity often associated with
controlled substances, the officer could temporarily detain
defendant to quickly dispel or confirm those reasonable
suspicions based on those articulated factors.
8. The suspicion was not dispelled by the brief
conversation, so the officer took the most rational step of
asking for consent, to quickly dispel or confirm the suspicion.
When that consent was refused, the office took the next
reasonable step designed to quickly, at roadside with a mobile
vehicle, dispel or justify and confirm his suspicion.

That

consisted of having a drug detection dog go around the vehicle

-8-
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quickly.
9. That dog alerted on the vehicle and that gave the
officers probable cause to initiate the search of the vehicle and
further detain defendant. Of course once the 60 pounds of
marijuana was found, there was probable cause to arrest. Again,
the actual arrest is not challenged except the basic claim it was
the product of an unlawful detention.

If the temporary detention

was unlawful, there is certainly no attenuation and the arrest
would be unlawful.
10. In combination and totality, the

xx

odor" factors amounted

to reasonable suspicion to further detain defendant. She was not
free to leave but was seized temporarily but that temporary
detention was justified by the articulated reasonable suspicion
the officer 'had. Defendant was not detained beyond the traffic
stop prior to Jensen's learning all of the above information.
11. Again, there is no challenge to anything but the
legality of the detention. The court has found and concludes
there was a detention but it was lawful.

The court DENIES the motion to suppress the results of the
\

search.

As noted in court, the matter is set for a status conference
June 2, 2008.

If the matter is to be set for trial at that time
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defendant is to be present.

If some further negotiations are to

be undertaken defendant need not be present until either those
negotiations are terminated and the matter is to be set for a
change of plea or a trial.

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
order is required.

r*1

DATED th is

J

(

day of

l/s&u

2008

BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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